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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2884 
___________ 
 
LA MAR GUNN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION; DOUGLAS A. SHACHTMAN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-00174) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 19, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 La Mar Gunn, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint.  We will vacate-in-part, affirm-in-part, and remand to the 
District Court.   
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 The facts are well-known to the parties, so we set forth only those pertinent to this 
appeal.  Gunn lost his property in Bear, Delaware through a foreclosure action.  On 
February 1, 2013, he filed a complaint alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), as well as breach of 
contract, against First American Financial Corporation (“First American”).  First 
American provided Gunn with title and settlement services in connection with the 
foreclosed property.  Gunn also asserted  a claim of legal malpractice against Douglas A. 
Shachtman, Esquire, who represented him in state court proceedings related to the 
foreclosure.  Gunn sought monetary damages from both parties.   
 Because Gunn was proceeding in forma pauperis, the District Court screened his 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Shachtman also filed a motion to 
dismiss.  The District Court concluded that Gunn’s claims under RESPA, TILA, and for 
breach of contract were time-barred, and dismissed them as frivolous pursuant to § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  (Dkt. No. 14, pp. 6-7.)  Shachtman’s motion to dismiss was granted on 
the basis of improper joinder pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), and 
the legal malpractice claim was dismissed without prejudice.  (Id. p. 9.)  Gunn timely 
appealed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 The District Court correctly noted that claims under RESPA and TILA must be 
brought within one to three years of the alleged violation.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) 
(TILA); 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (RESPA).  Gunn alleged that his loan was finalized on April 
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17, 2006, thereby ending his relationship with First American.  The District Court 
concluded that his RESPA and TILA claims against First American were time-barred, as 
his complaint was not filed until February 1, 2013, far outside of the applicable time 
frame.   (Dkt. No. 3, p. 7.)  The District Court also correctly determined that the statute of 
limitations in Delaware for breach of contract claims is three years.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 
10, § 8106(a).  Gunn alleged that First American breached its contract on March 6, 2006, 
when it issued the title insurance policy on the foreclosed property.  The District Court 
concluded that the claim was similarly time-barred.  (Id.)   
 Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Robinson v. Johnson, 
313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir.2002), a complaint can be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
if the allegations show that relief is barred under the relevant statute of limitations.  See 
Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 920-21 (2007) (recognizing that “[w]hether a particular 
ground for opposing a claim may be the basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim 
depends on whether the allegations in the complaint suffice to establish that ground, not 
on the nature of the ground in the abstract”).  Thus, a district court may sua sponte 
dismiss a claim as time-barred where it is apparent from the complaint that the applicable 
limitations period has run.  However, if a complaint is vulnerable to such a dismissal, a 
district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.  Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Grayson 
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Dismissal without leave to 
amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.  Id. 
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at 236.  If a pro se plaintiff can cure his factual allegations in order to state a claim, he 
should be given an opportunity to do so.   
 On appeal, Gunn argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his  RESPA, 
TILA, and breach of contract claims sua sponte.  He argues that the statutes of limitations 
for TILA, RESPA, and breach of contract are subject to equitable tolling because First 
American concealed its fraudulent conduct, such that he could not have discovered it 
within the applicable time periods.  The District Court did not consider whether equitable 
tolling applied and dismissed Gunn’s claims against First American as frivolous.  Gunn 
argues that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint before it was 
dismissed.  We agree.   
 Gunn is correct that fraudulent concealment can serve to toll the statutes of 
limitations at issue here.  See EBS Litig. LLC v. Barclays Global Investors, N.A., 304 
F.3d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 2002) (Delaware recognizes fraudulent concealment as a source of 
equitable tolling); Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 505 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(TILA’s statute of limitations “is not jurisdictional and is therefore subject to equitable 
tolling”);  Garczynski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 2d 505, 516 (E.D. 
Pa. 2009) (explaining why, under Ramadan, equitable tolling applies to RESPA claims).  
For a statute of limitations to be tolled due to a First American’s fraudulent concealment, 
Gunn needed to prove that (1) First American actively misled him respecting his claim; 
(2) First American prevented him from recognizing the validity of the claim within the 
limitations period; and (3) he  used reasonable diligence in uncovering the relevant facts 
5 
 
that formed the basis of his claim.  Poskin v. TD Banknorth, N.A., 687 F. Supp. 2d 530, 
551 (W.D. Pa. 2009).   
 The District Court should have granted Gunn leave to amend his complaint to 
include his allegations of fraudulent concealment.
1
  Such an amendment would not have 
been inequitable, as First American hadn’t even entered an appearance in the case; nor 
would it have been futile, as a properly pleaded claim of fraudulent concealment could 
serve to equitably toll some, if not all, of the statutes of limitations imposed by the 
District Court.  Though Gunn’s brief is replete with allegations of fraudulent 
concealment, we express no opinion on their merits.
2
  The District Court should consider 
them in the first instance.  We will, therefore, vacate the dismissal of Gunn’s claims 
against First American.     
 We will, however, affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the legal malpractice 
claim against Shachtman.  We agree that joinder was inappropriate under Rule 20.  There 
were no common questions of law or fact pertaining to First American and Shachtman.  
                                              
1
 Allegations of fraudulent concealment must meet the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b).  Therefore, plaintiffs must plead fraudulent concealment with 
particularity.  Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 741 F.2d 620, 626 (3d Cir. 1984); Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”). “The plaintiff must plead or allege the 
date, time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure of 
substantiation into a fraud allegation.”  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
 
2
 First American did not enter an appearance or file anything in the District Court, nor has 
it entered an appearance or filed an answering brief in this Court.   
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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B).  As the District Court recognized, Gunn’s complaint was 
“in reality two complaints, each of which is legally unrelated to the other.”  (Dkt. No. 14, 
p. 8.)  The District Court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and 
dismissed the claim against Shachtman without prejudice to Gunn’s filing a new 
complaint, if and when appropriate.
3
   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the legal 
malpractice claim.  We will vacate the dismissal of Gunn’s TILA, RESPA, and Delaware 
breach of contract claims and remand to the District Court for consideration of the issue 
of equitable tolling after Gunn has filed an amended complaint.   
                                              
3
 The District Court aptly pointed out that “a purely state law case alleging malpractice is 
better managed by the state courts.”  (Dkt. No. 14, p. 9.)   
